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Humanitarian law rests on fragile foundations. It is true that its purpose,
to protect basic human values in times of immediate threat to physical
integrity and to life, will in principle find support in every culture. But it
depends on so many circumstances and assumptions that its acceptance
appears to be an expression of civilization that today can no longer be taken
for granted. Humanitarian law calls for the rule of law in the context of
violence, hate, and anarchy. Its rules are applicable without regard to
reciprocity, even though the expectation of reciprocity is in practice one of the
main motivations for accepting rules. The driving force behind military
operations is end-oriented efficiency, not the pursuit of humanitarian
considerations. The deeper and more fundamental a dispute between enemies
grows, the less the inhibitions to disregard humanitarian law; religious beliefs
and assertions of the principle of military necessity may attest to this dilemma.
Of course, the immediate threats of military defeat and of personal
capture have always threatened the rule of humanitarian law. Commentators
may not always accept or express the resulting fragility of humanitarian rules,
but in reality there is little doubt that no other segment of international rules
depends for its acceptance so much on the circumstances and the climate of
the moment.
In the context of the evolving international political climate, the most
pressing questions for the future of humanitarian law will not concern
questions of detail, but their suitability and acceptance in the fight against
terrorism and the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. Will those powers,
public or private, from whom such threats may arise, be inclined to accept, in
principle, the rules of humanitarian law? Will those states fighting these
powers be prepared to observe humanitarian law under such circumstances?
And will the asymmetry between high technology and primitive weaponry
reduce the willingness to comply with humanitarian law?
An equally, if not more, important question is whether the erosion of the
rules on the legality of war as they were laid down in the Charter of the United
Nations and largely accepted since 1945 will spill over into the realm of
humanitarian law. And, even more broadly speaking, would an eventual
international climate eroding the foundations of the rule of law in international
relations remain isolated from the humanitarian rules, with their inherent
fragility?
As to the type and nature of wars in the future, it does not appear
unrealistic today to assume that terrorist movements, countries in possession
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of weapons of mass destruction, and countries suspected of gaining access to
such weapons will come to the forefront of theaters of war. Predicting the
values, priorities, and goals of such actors is highly speculative. But it is by no
means unlikely that the balance of values which has led civilized nations in
the past century to accept rules of humanitarian warfare may be overshadowed
in the strategic thinking of such powers by the absoluteness of the objectives
and goals which they pursue. Suicide bombers and their ilk are not likely to
worry over the Geneva conventions and their interpretation, and states which
have built up systems for weapons of mass destruction, possibly undercover in
order to protect their interests, may also not share the priorities which underlie
the Geneva Conventions.
In view of such enemies, or potential enemies, it is unrealistic to expect
that states, targeted by radical fundamentalists, will draw the lines in their
defensive actions, and their strategies in general, precisely in accordance with
the humanitarian values which have informed the Geneva Conventions. In the
absence of an expectation of reciprocity during armed conflict and the ideal of
a harmonious coexistence of the enemies after the end of a war, public support
for a graceful conduct of warfare may vanish quickly. The differing attitudes
of the United States and large segments of European public opinion toward
the prisoners in Guantanamo after the Afghan war presumably reflected the
different sense of threat: had the Eiffel tower or the Frankfurt financial
highrises been hit instead of the Word Trade Center, the sentiment toward the
enemy prisoners might well have been different in France or Germany, and
less room would have been left for the spokespersons in support of a broad
interpretation of the Geneva rules.
The radical differences in technology available to wage war may also
militate against humanitarian considerations of warfare. While it appears
doubtful that high technology weaponry, dominated by a new generation of
weaponry produced in the United States, indeed led to more civilian victims in
the Kosovo war and in the 2003 Iraq war, situations and considerations may
vary in the future. And on the part of terrorists and states inclined to use
weapons of mass destruction, the difference in weaponry may prompt
considerations of the need to use all available means, regardless of their
precise effects, so as to counter the superior weapons of the enemy.
A second front on the horizon of humanitarian law concerns the linkage
in practice between humanitarian law and the laws on the legality of war. If it
indeed turns out that the regime of Chapter VII as negotiated in 1945 becomes
obsolete in light of new challenges not foreseen in 1945, and not manageable
on the basis of these rules in the opinion of the international community or of
major actors, the impact of such a new situation on humanitarian law would
by no means be clear-cut. Of course, many will argue that humanity in
warfare becomes even more important in case the prohibition on the use of
force becomes porous, and more wars result. Indeed, this would be the
consequence derived from the application of humanitarian law and its purpose
to protect human values, rather than efficiency in warfare. However, a realistic
perspective will not overlook that this is only one possible conclusion and that
other scenarios are also conceivable in practice. Indeed, it may be argued that
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progress achieved since 1945 in thejus ad bellum and thejus in bello has been
founded on experiences, values, and priorities reflected in both legal areas;
that the two bodies of law are tied together in their foundations; and that an
erosion in the right to initiate war will have repercussions and prompt parallel
regressions in the rules regulating warfare. A state that has acted
inconsistently with accepted rules in initiating war will not always find it easy
to invoke the rules governing humane treatment of prisoners with success,
again because of the possibility of mutual escalation of rhetoric and disrespect
for the rights of the other side.
On a third front, a scenario of a general decline in the rule of law in
international relations will need to be taken into account. The past few years
have seen major developments that would favor cooperation based on legal
rules, but instances that pose questions in this context have been equally
prominent. And, of course, the rules governing the right to initiate a war are at
the heart of the current legal framework. Whenever the rule of law begins to
fluctuate, a spillover into the rules of warfare may follow; as one of the most
vulnerable areas, and in this sense the weakest segment of international law,
humanitarian law might well suffer from any loosening of the general fabric
of international law.
Against this background, it appears that there are clouds and fog on the
horizon of humanitarian law, not because of uncertainties about any particular
facet of this law, but because of the broader context and climate surrounding
humanitarian law.
The military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq were meant to counteract
intolerable forces of terror and instability. The vision of a new and better
world order, however, cannot be built on a military response alone.
International law, weak as it has always been, has evolved as a key instrument
for preserving and creating order. Alternatives such as strict unilateralism,
even when founded in principle, do not promise more order. If the
considerations set forth above are correct, the gravest threats to humanitarian
law will arise from instabilities in the laws governing the use of force and an
erosion of the basic notion of the rule of law as a guiding force in international
relations.
The current forces threatening the rule of law are essentially tied to
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These issues
have occupied the international agenda in the past. But too often they have
been relegated to the rank of secondary issues by matters of daily and
immediate concern considered as requiring a direct response regardless of
long-term effects. The purposes of humanitarian law would be best served if
the order of priority is reversed and the long-term fight against terrorism and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is moved to the center stage
of international relations. This reordering of priorities must be accomplished
without regard to daily, weekly, or monthly concerns diverting political
attention in other directions. The evolution of humanitarian law will depend
on its broader context. Its object and purposes will be best served if the
international agenda is freed from the forces of terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction.
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What is required is more reflection and action on long-term strategies to
counter these systematic threats, taking into account their origins, their driving
forces, and the conditions for their spreading. In other words, the strength of
the military response must be matched by a diplomatic effort with the same
determination, guided by a reflection of the conditions for long-term
international stability and a positive role of international law for achieving
these goals. Humanitarian law will grow and survive only within the
framework of a broader context that accepts and fosters both humanitarian
goals and the rule of law. The war in Iraq was unique in its underlying abstract
goal-to deter terrorism, to free the world from dangerous despots, and to
signal that the free world is willing to defend its values against such dark
forces. After the war, the same focus on success, and the same willingness to
pursue the same goals, will both be required on the diplomatic level to truly
move the international system toward stability, freedom, and the rule of law.
